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Special Protection Is Not the Solution to
Save Domestic Steel: A Critique of the
Bush Steel Initiative
Matthew J.S. Graham*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. steel industry is in crisis.' Global gluts of steel
and low prices have driven many domestic steel companies into
bankruptcy.2 The steel industry has sought protection from for-
eign competition in order to return itself to profitability.3 Presi-
dent Bush has obliged and is pursuing a three-part Steel Initia-
tive.4 The initiative consists of entering into voluntary export
restraint agreements with steel producing countries, negotiating
the end of steel subsidies worldwide, and placing tariffs on cer-
tain steel imports pursuant to an International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) Section 2016 investigation.6
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S., 2000, Univer-
sity of North Dakota.
1. Robert Guy Matthews, Man of Steel: Bush Shows His Mettle, WALL ST. J.,
July 2, 2001, at Al.
2. Robert Guy Matthews, U.S. Steel Mills Lift Key Domestic Prices, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 10, 2002, at A2.
3. Barry D. Solarz, US Steel Industry: What the Future Holds, at
http://www.econstrat.orglbsolarz.htm (May 24, 2001).
4. Bush Statement on Steel Negotiations, Import Investigation, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summitOV01060501.htm (June 5, 2001).
5. The ITC is an "independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency that
provides trade expertise to both the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment, determines the impact of imports on United States industries, and directs ac-
tions against certain unfair trade practices." U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ABOUT THE
USITC, at http'//usitc.gov/webabout.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2001). Section 201 re-
fers to the safeguard provision of the Trade Act of 1974. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 597 (3d ed. 1995). The ITC's objective in
a Section 201 investigation is to determine whether "an article is being imported in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or threat
thereof, to the United States industry producing an article like or directly competi-
tive with the imported article." 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
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This Note seeks to understand President Bush's Steel Ini-
tiative and how it can be reconciled with a commitment to free
trade. In a broader sense, this Note examines whether the do-
mestic steel industry is deserving of any form of special protec-
tion. Part I briefly describes the current state of the steel indus-
try, prior attempts to shield it from foreign competition, and
President Bush's Steel Initiative. Part II analyzes President
Bush's proposal under free trade principles. Section II.A. con-
siders and rejects common arguments that an exception to free
trade principles should be made for the steel industry. Section
II.B. critiques the President's Steel Initiative. Next, Section
II.C. proposes a course of action the President should follow.
This Note concludes that the domestic steel industry should not
be given special protection at the expense of U.S. consumers in
the form of voluntary export restraint agreements or tariffs and
that President Bush should rescind the tariffs he enacted and
proceed to negotiate an end to steel subsidies with steel produc-
ing countries worldwide.
I. THE STATE OF THE DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY AND
PRESIDENT BUSH'S STEEL INITIATIVE
A. THE DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY
The domestic steel industry is struggling.7 More than half
of domestic steel companies have filed for bankruptcy within the
last four years." Thousands of steel workers have lost their
jobs.9 Utilization of domestic steel capacity has been approxi-
mately seventy-five percent,10 a rate too low for many companies
to be profitable." Each year, approximately twenty percent of
6. Bush Statement on Steel Negotiations, Import Investigation, supra note 4.
7. Matthews, supra note 1.
8. Matthews, supra note 2.
9. Thomas J. Usher, The Steel Industry Is Hurting, But It Can be Saved,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at A20.
10. Robert Guy Matthews, Steelmakers Say They Are a Key Component of Secu-
rity, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at B4.
11. Id. High capacity utilization is very important to achieve profitability in
the steel industry. INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE: REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: GLOBAL STEEL TRADE: STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND FUTURE SOLUTIONS
14 (July 2000), available at www.ita.doc.gov/media/steelreport726.html [hereinafter
The Report]. Many of the major costs associated with the operation of a steel mill are
fixed. Id. These costs include large capital investments to construct the mill and
depreciation costs. Id. In addition, labor costs can be considered a fixed cost in this
[Vo1.12:1
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domestic demand is supplied through imports. 2 One reason
that foreign firms can undercut domestic firms on price" is their
lower labor costs. 4 Also detrimental to the domestic steel indus-
try is that the world's steel makers have recently produced ap-
proximately ten percent more steel than consumers demand. 5
This situation has sent domestic steel prices to twenty-year
lows.
16
These industry dilemmas come at a time when the steel in-
dustry should be booming. 7 There has been a long period of
U.S. economic expansion, soaring steel demand, and high price
levels.' 8 Since 1980, the industry has modernized and under-
gone significant restructuring.' 9 The industry has reduced em-
ployment by two-thirds, while nearly tripling labor productiv-
industry because of labor contracts that emphasize job security. Id. Moreover, once
a mill is shut down, it is very expensive to restart production. Id. These factors re-
quire steel makers to run at a high capacity to maintain profitability and encourage
them to keep producing even when there is low demand. Id.
12. Robert Guy Matthews, Trade Panel Rules for U.S. Steelmakers, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A2. The United States imported 28.3 million tons of steel in
1997. EUI US: Bush Threatens Steel Import Barriers, 6/9/01 EUR. REP. 508, avail-
able at 2001 WL 26057542 (June 9, 2001). This number rose by ten million tons in
1998 during the Asian economic crisis before falling back to thirty-four million tons
in 2000. Id. Preliminary 2001 reports indicate a significant downturn in steel im-
port levels. Id.
13. The domestic industry argues that foreign firms beat them on prices be-
cause their governments subsidize them. Robert Guy Matthews, U.S Steel Industry
Itself Gets Billions in Public Subsidies, Study Concludes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1999,
at B12. However, the domestic industry itself has also received substantial support
from public subsidies. Id.
14. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1196. Workers in the steel industry are paid
much more than their counterparts in manufacturing in that steel wages rose to 175
percent of average manufacturing wages in 1981. See id. From an efficiency stand-
point, countries with low labor costs should produce goods that require labor. See id.
at 18. The law of comparative cost advantage posits that if a country has low labor
costs, that country should specialize in the production of labor intensive goods, and
their trading partners should specialize in goods that require more capital, skilled
labor, or technology. See id. Encouraging countries to produce products for which
they do not have a low comparative cost causes inefficiency. See id.
15. Matthews, supra note 12. More steel is produced than is demanded in part
because the high fixed costs of production discourage steel makers from reducing
output. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Another reason production stays
above demand is that there are many noncompetitive practices in the world steel
industry. See The Report, supra note 11, at 4. The noncompetitive practices distort
the market and lead to production decisions different from those that would be made
in a competitive market. Id. In a competitive market, production would eventually
fall to the level demanded. Id.
16. Matthews, supra note 12.
17. Solarz, supra note 3.
18. EU/US: Bush Threatens Steel Import Barriers, supra note 12, at 508.
19. The Report, supra note 11, at 6-7.
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ity.2 ' At the same time, the industry has received billions of dol-
lars in subsidies from local, state, and federal governments.21 In
fact, steel imports into the United States have been under some
form of restraint for the last twenty five years.2 2
The industry subsidy most costly to the U.S. public was a
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER) agreement negotiated by
President Reagan. In 1984, the steel industry petitioned the
ITC for relief from imports under Section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974.23 The ITC recommended quotas, but President Reagan in-
stead entered into a VER agreement with countries exporting
significant amounts of steel into the United States.24 These im-
port restraint agreements reduced the import share of the U.S.
steel supply.25 It has been estimated that the Reagan steel VER
increased the price of imported steel by thirty percent and in-
creased the price of domestic steel by twelve percent.26 The VER
cost U.S. consumers between $1.1 billion and $6.8 billion.27
Some of this cost was extra profit to foreign steel producers be-
cause the reduced quantity of steel they were allowed to sell in
the United States was more than offset by the higher prices they
could charge. 5
20. Solarz, supra note 3.
21. See Matthews, supra note 13. One subsidy from the federal government,
The Emergency Steel and Oil and Gas Guaranteed Loan Program Act, provides
guaranteed loans to steel companies unable to obtain credit from other sources. See
id. This program was estimated to cost up to $1 billion in loan guarantees. See id.
Further, in 1974, at a cost of $2 billion, the federal government paid the pensions of
retirees from steel companies unable to pay the benefits themselves. See id.
22. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1195. Japan and the European Union lim-
ited exports to the United States under voluntary export restraint agreements from
1969 to 1974. See id. In 1978, a "trigger price mechanism" was implemented as a
substitute for the antidumping petitions filed by the domestic steel industry. See id.
An antidumping petition is a unilateral response to alleged unfair trade actions. See
id. at 666. These petitions are allowed under international trade rules. See id. This
plan allowed the United States government to file for expedited antidumping pro-
ceedings if the steel imports fell below the trigger price. See id. at 1195. The
mechanism stayed in place only as long as the domestic steel industry did not file a
significant amount of antidumping petitions itself. See id. In 1982, the industry did
file a significant number of petitions and the mechanism was eliminated. See id.
During this time, as a result of one of the petitions, the European Union agreed to
limit steel exports to the United States. See id.
23. See supra note 5 for an explanation of a Section 201 investigation.
24. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1196.
25. See id.
26. Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United
States With Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 539, 555 (1993).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 556.
[Vol.12:l
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The Reagan Steel VER also cost many U.S. citizens their
jobs. 9 Although it was estimated that 16,900 jobs were saved in
the steel industry, approximately 52,400 jobs were eliminated in
industries that used steel.y Other estimates concluded that the
VER destroyed 170,825 more jobs than it created.3 It has been
estimated that each job saved in the steel industry cost
$750,000.32 The voluntary restraints ended in 1992.33 Nonethe-
less, this unprecedented support for the steel industry has re-
mained intact while the world has moved towards free trade
policies and away from protectionist support for other indus-
tries.'
There are many explanations why the steel industry has re-
ceived special protection while other industries are forced to
compete in a free trade environment. The first and most cynical
reason is politics. 35 The steel industry is centralized in impor-
36tant swing states, such as West Virginia and Pennsylvania.
National government officials might be willing to help the in-
dustry in a quid pro quo for reelection.3 ' Another explanation is
that the government may also be protecting the steel industry in
an attempt to save domestic jobs or increase wages.38 In addi-
tion, some argue that the steel industry should be protected be-
cause they believe that having a strong steel industry is essen-
tial to our national defense.39 Others believe that the industry
29. Id. at 558.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. McGee, supra note 26, at 559.
33. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1196.
34. See id. at 202.
35. Virginia Postrel, Why Bush Stiffed Enron, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at
A18.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 18 (refuting the common argument that in-
terference in free trade is necessary to protect high paid workers from competition
from low paid workers); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 696 (9th ed. 1973) (ex-
plaining that it is advantageous for trading partners if a country with low labor
costs produces goods that require a large amount of labor); McGee, supra note 26, at
545 (noting that while protecting labor is a common argument for protectionism, the
evidence suggests that protectionism costs more jobs than it saves); Alan 0. Sykes,
Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 211-12
(1989) (indicating that although workers who compete with subsidized foreign im-
ports may be harmed, helping them with unemployment benefits is more efficient
than protecting them with protectionist policies).
39. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 18-19 (stating that although many industries
argue they are necessary for national defense, they will not likely disappear if not
protected by the government); SAMUELSON, supra note 38, at 693-94 (stating that
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will return to profitability if it is given a temporary break fromforein .• 40
foreign competition.
The domestic steel industry is looking overseas for an ex-
planation of their current woes.41 It blames "massive worldwide
steel overcapacity.., in many cases funded by governments
through a variety of subsidies, closed markets, cartels, and other
private anticompetitive behavior." 42 The industry is asking for a
sustained period of steel import stability as a solution to its
problems.43 Steel imports would be discouraged under the plan
sought by domestic steel producers.44 This would give the indus-
try time to restructure itself without fear of lower prices from
foreign competitors.4 ' The domestic steel industry has lobbied
the President for relief to get the leave of absence from foreign
competition it desires.
B. THE PRESIDENT'S STEEL INITIATIVE
President Bush has responded to the steel lobby 47 by propos-
ing an initiative to bail out the domestic steel industry.48 The
initiative was "designed to restore market forces to world steel
beneficial international trade decreases the chances of war); U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN
A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 292 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987) (arguing that erect-
ing trade barriers can depress national economies and lead to a greater likelihood of
war); AM. INST. FOR INT'L STEEL, INC., AIIS PRESIDENT DAVID PHELPS URGES
PROPONENTS OF FREE TRADE IN STEEL TO TAKE ACTION, at
http://www.aiis.org/release/?file=release79.htm (Oct. 1, 2001) (arguing that the
United States will be able to meet its steel needs in times of war without resorting to
protectionist policies).
40. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1196 (noting that the steel industry has been
given help before and has not used the opportunity to return to profitability);
McGee, supra note 26, at 549 (giving an industry temporary breathing room usually
does not work in practice); Matthews, supra note 12 (reporting that domestic steel
producers desire a temporary break from foreign competition in order to return to
profitability).
41. Solarz, supra note 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The domestic steel industry has a very strong lobby. David Wessel, Big
Steel Still Enjoys Outsized Clout on Trade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2001, at Al. This is
because the domestic steel industry has a lot to gain by lobbying for trade restraints
that raise prices, while no individual consumer has much of an interest in opposing
them. Id. Another big factor is that most of the steel industry is in swing vote
states, such as West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, that are considered essential
for President Bush to win reelection. Id.
48. Bush Statement on Steel Negotiations, Import Investigation, supra note 4.
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markets and eliminate the practices that harm our steel indus-
try and its workers." 9 The initiative consists of three steps. °
First, the President directed the U.S. Trade Representative to
enter into negotiations with U.S. trading partners in order to
reduce worldwide excess steel capacity, 51 which would constitute
a VER.52 Second, the President asked the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to enter into negotiations with steel producing nations to
promulgate rules that will govern the steel trade and eliminate
the underlying market-distorting subsidies.53 Third, the Presi-
dent initiated an ITC Section 201 Investigation to determine if
the domestic steel industry has been harmed by steel imports.54
The President's plan to protect the domestic steel industry
from foreign competition is starting to take shape.5 President
Bush completed the first step of his Steel Initiative by entering
into a VER agreement with countries that export steel to the
United States. 6 Most of the world's steel exporters agreed to
cut a total of 97.5 million tons of steel capacity
57 by 2010.58
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. This part of President Bush's plan is similar to President Clinton's
1993 effort to return the domestic aluminum industry to profitability. David Givins,
Stealing an Idea From Aluminum, at http://www.dismal.com/thoughts/article.asp?
aid=1300 (July 24, 2001). To achieve that end, the United States brokered a world-
wide aluminum cartel to raise prices and save the domestic producers. Id. This pact
was between the United States, European Union, Norway, Australia, Russia, and
Canada. Matthews, supra note 1. It was estimated that fewer than 5,000 jobs were
saved by the production quotas, at a cost of close to $500,000 per job. C. Fred
Bergsten, Aluminum Tests Clinton's Mettle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1994, at A10. Al-
though some countries exceeded their quota limits, the aluminum production
agreement was successful in raising prices and returning the U.S. aluminum indus-
try to profitability. See Givins, supra. Prices jumped as much as thirty-five percent.
Matthews, supra note 1. The agreement dissolved as world demand rose to support
capacity. See Givins, supra. Although the industry is now profitable, some have
questioned whether the benefits outweigh the costs. See Bergsten, supra.
52. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 597.
53. Bush Statement on Steel Negotiations, Import Investigation, supra note 4.
54. Id; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining the ITC and
Section 201 investigation).
55. Robert Guy Matthews, Steelmakers Set Pact to Reduce World Capacity,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2001, at A3.
56. Id; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
57. Since the agreement is to cut capacity and not production, countries, such
as Japan, that planned to produce under what the capacity cuts will allow will not
be affected. Matthews, supra note 55.
58. Id. This is half as much as President Bush wanted, but is still significant.
Id. President Bush wanted to cut capacity by 200 million tons and achieve those
cuts on a faster time frame than that which was agreed upon. Id. The long time
frame is also a concern because government officials in signatory countries are likely
to change and may be less willing to strictly enforce an agreement they did not
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol.12:1
Although the President has stated that his initiative will
comply with WTO obligations, the VER agreement may be a
violation of U.S. commitments to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). VERs were brought into the purview
of GATTs0 during the Uruguay Round."' The Uruguay Round
Agreement on Safeguards 2 requires that virtually all VERs be
eliminated s3
Progress is also being made on the third part of the Presi-
dent's steel initiative. On June 22, 2001, the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative formally requested the U.S. ITC to conduct a Section
201 investigation under the Trade Act of 1974.64 The ITC's ob-
jective in a Section 201 investigation is to determine whether
"an article is being imported into the United States in such in-
creased quantities as to be a substantial cause 5 of serious in-. 66
jury, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an
article like or directly competitive with the imported article."67
On October 22, 2001, the ITC reached an affirmative deci-
make. Id. In addition, some of the countries agreed because they hoped to avoid
even more protectionist measures, which President Bush is still pursuing. Id.
President Bush used the threat of closing off U.S. markets to persuade countries to
agree to the VER. Matthews, supra note 12.
59. Bush Statement on Steel Negotiations, Import Investigation, supra note 4.
60. See infra notes 96-97.
61. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 597. A VER is also called a "gray area meas-
ure," because it was unclear whether they were subject to GATT before the Uruguay
Round. See id. It was thought that reliance on a VER undermines the safeguard
provision, Article XIX, of GATT. See id. Now that VERs are prohibited, it is ex-
pected there will be an increased reliance on Article XIX. See id.; see also infra note
96 (describing the WTO).
62. See infra note 96.
63. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 597. The agreement stipulates that a "mem-
ber shall not seek, take, or maintain any voluntary export restraints... or any other
similar measures on the import side." Id. at 609 (quoting GATT Focus Newsletter,
Dec. 1993, at 11).
64. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ZOELLICK REQUESTS
COMPREHENSIVE STEEL INVESTIGATION, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topicallecon/
group8/summit01/01062502.htm (June 22, 2001); see supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text (explaining Section 201). The ITC must submit a report of its investigation
within 180 days of the President's request. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(f)(1) (2000).
65. Substantial cause means "a cause which is important and not less than any
other cause." 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)(B).
66. Serious injury means a "significant overall impairment in the position of a
domestic industry." 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(6)(C).
67. Id. § 2252(b)(1)(A). The threshold issue is whether imports of the competi-
tive merchandise have increased. Kevin C. Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under
Section 337, Section 301, and the Escape Clause: The Case for Less Discretion, 20
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 136 (1987).
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sion that steel products" are "being imported into the United
States in such increased quantities that they are a substantial
cause of serious injury or threat of serious injury to the U.S. in-
dustry."69 The ITC further recommended that President Bush
adopt tariffs and quotas on imported steel to protect the domes-
tic industry.70 The ITC recommended additional tariffs71 rang-
ing from five to forty percent on sixteen key steel products for
four years.7 2
Pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974, the President makes the
68. The ITC divided steel products into thirty-three product categories and
made a specific finding for each category. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, ITC DETAILS
ITS DETERMINATIONS CONCERNING IMPACT OF STEEL ON U.S. INDUSTRY, at
http://www.usitc.gov (Oct. 23, 2001). The ITC made an affirmative finding of harm
for the following steel products: carbon slabs, carbon plate, hot-rolled, cold-rolled,
coated, hot bar/light shapes, cold bar, rebar, welded, carbon flanges, bar/light
shapes, and rod. Id. The ITC had a tie vote on a finding of harm for the following
steel products: tin, tool steel, wire, and stainless flanges. Id. In the case of a tie, the
ITC will proceed to a remedy phase with respect to those products. Id. The Presi-
dent may consider either decision as the determination of the ITC. Id. The ITC
found that imports of the following products had not harmed the domestic industry:
GOES, ingots, rails, wire, strand, nails, heavy shapes, fabricated units, seamless
OCTG, stainless slabs, stainless plate, cloth, rope, stainless pipe, and welded pipe.
Id.
69. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 68.
70. Robert Guy Matthews, Commission Recommends Steel Tariffs, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 10, 2001, at B6. The Commission may recommend an increase in duty, imposi-
tion of a quota, trade adjustment assistance, or any combination of such actions. 19
U.S.C. § 2252(e)(2) (2000). The ITC may also recommend that the President enter
into negotiations with trading partners to find and eliminate the cause of the in-
creased imports. Id. § 2252 (e)(4)(A).
71. A tariff will usually raise the price a consumer must pay for a good. See
JACKSON, supra note 5, at 16. This is because the tariff acts as an artificial cost to
the foreign producer. See id. In addition, domestic manufacturers will often raise
the price of their goods because they no longer have to compete against the foreign
producer. See id. Tariffs and other like measures have been estimated to raise the
cost of imported goods in the United States by twenty percent and raise the price of
similar domestic goods by ten to fourteen percent. McGee, supra note 26, at 553.
The government will also get revenue from the tariff. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at
16. Therefore, domestic producers "gain" from tariffs because of higher sale prices,
and the government "gains" in the form of higher revenues. See id. The foreign pro-
ducers "lose" from tariffs because they have to overcome artificial costs to be com-
petitive, and domestic consumers "lose" because they have to pay higher prices. See
id. The sum of these gains and losses will be negative, indicating a real economic
loss. McGee, supra note 26, at 553. However, tariffs are a preferred method of pro-
tectionism compared with VERs because the importing nation's government will get
added revenue instead of foreign firms getting added profits. See JACKSON, supra
note 5, at 17.
72. Matthews, supra note 70; see also U.S. INTL TRADE COMM'N,
INVESTIGATION No. TA-201-73, VOLUME I: DETERMINATIONS AND VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONERS, at 2, available at www.usitc.gov (Dec. 2001).
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final decision on what type of relief,3 if any, will be granted.14
This Act 75 provides that "the President.. .shall take all appro-
priate and feasible action within his power which the President
determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to
make a positive adjustment to import competition 76 and provide
greater economic and social benefits than cost."
77
On March 5, 2002, President Bush signed a proclamation
enacting tariffs up to thirty percent on certain steel products. s
The tariffs will last approximately three years.79 The President
exempted Canada, Israel, Jordan, and Mexico from the tariffs.80
The Proclamation gives President Bush the power to reduce,
modify, or terminate the tariffs.1 In addition, the President may
grant exclusions to certain producers.82 As a result of the tariffs,
supply is shrinking and steel prices are already starting to
83
rise.
73. The President may "proclaim an increase in, or the imposition of, any duty
on the imported article; proclaim a tariff-rate quota on the article...; negotiate, con-
clude, and carry out agreements with foreign countries limiting the export from for-
eign countries and the import into the United States of such an article...; [and] ini-
tiate international negotiations to address the underlying cause of the increase in
imports...." 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (2000).
74. Id. § 2253(a)(1)(A). The President is to take into account several factors in
deciding what relief to provide. Id. § 2253(a)(2). These include: "the recommenda-
tion and report of the Commission; the extent to which workers and firms in the do-
mestic industry are benefiting from adjustment assistance...; the efforts being
made, or to be implemented, by the domestic industry.. .to make a positive adjust-
ment to import competition; the probable effectiveness of the actions... ; the short-
and long-term economic and social costs of the actions.. relative to their short- and
long-term economic and social benefits...; [and] the national security interests of
the United States.. . ." Id.
75. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76. A positive adjustment to import competition occurs when the domestic in-
dustry is able to compete successfully with imports after actions taken terminate, or
the domestic industry experiences an orderly transfer of resources to other produc-
tive pursuits, and dislocated workers in the industry experience an orderly transi-
tion to productive pursuits. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (2000).
77. Id. § 2251(a).
78. Robert Guy Matthews, U.S. Steelmakers Increase Prices as Supply Tight-
ens, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2002, at A2; see Steel Products Proclamation, at
www.whitehouse.gov (Mar. 5, 2002).
79. Steel Products Proclamation, supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Proclamation provides, "If I determine that further action is ap-
propriate and feasible to facilitate efforts by the pertinent domestic industry to make
a positive adjustment to import competition and to provide greater economic and
social benefits than costs.. .I shall reduce, modify, or terminate the action estab-
lished in this proclamation accordingly." Id.
82. Id.
83. Robert Guy Matthews, Foreign Steelmakers Increase Prices, WALL ST. J.,
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This initiative is strongly opposed by domestic industries
that use steel.84  These industries include metal fabrication,
transportation, industrial machinery, and construction." Com-
bined, these industries employ many more workers than the
steel industry." Representatives of these industries argue that
low prices caused by steel imports improve the profitability of
their companies and paying more for steel will make them un-
competitive in the world market.8 They also argue that jobs in
steel consuming industries will be lost if the steel industry is re-
lieved from foreign competition.
Many countries and organizations that sell steel in the
United States could also be affected by President Bush's steel
initiative.90 Trading partners are concerned because interna-
tional trade increases the wealth of trading partners.9 The
American Institute for International Steel (AIIS),92 the United
May 10, 2002, at A2.
84. Steel Bailout Idea Draws Foes Among Longshoremen, Big Ports, Farmers,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, at Al.
85. The Report, supra note 11, at 12.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Robert Guy Matthews, EU Plan on Steel Imports Gets Bush Veto, Feb. 8,
2002, WALL ST. J., at A2.
89. Id.
90. EUIUS: Bush Threatens Steel Import Barriers, supra note 12, at 508.
These countries include Japan, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, China, Indonesia,
Ukraine, India, South Africa, and Australia. Id. The world's largest steel producer,
the European Union, will also be affected. Id.
91. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 597. The President's proposals would inter-
fere with free trade and are, therefore, undesirable from an economic perspective.
See SAMUELSON, supra note 38, at 692. Free trade "promotes a mutually profitable
regional division of labor, greatly enhances the potential real national product of all
nations, and makes possible higher standards of living all over the globe." Id. One
argument against restraints on trade is that they cause inefficiency. See JACKSON,
supra note 5, at 16. There are many forms of economic waste that arise from protec-
tionist measures, such as allocative inefficiencies and rent-seeking behavior. See id.
There will be allocative inefficiencies because domestic producers will divert re-
sources to make the protected product that would have been allocated to another
product if not for the tariff. See id. There will be waste when domestic industries
spend resources lobbying the government for protection and foreign industries spend
to defeat proposed protectionist measures. See id. at 17. These "rent seeking" costs
may be significant. See id. In addition, some consumers will be "priced out" of the
market by the higher prices the protectionist measures promulgate. See id. at 16.
92. AM. INST. FOR INT'L STEEL, INC., AIIS: BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S STEEL
PLAN WILL ONLY SUCCEED IF SOLUTIONS ARE MARKET-BASED AND ELIMINATE U.S.
NON-ECONOMIC STEELMAKING CAPACITY, at http://www.aiis.org/release/?file=release
71.htm (June 6, 2001). AIIS is a trade association "committed to economic growth
through competition in steel trade." Id. The AIIS applauds the President's plan to
eliminate inefficient steel capacity and subsidies, but vehemently opposes any addi-
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Kingdom Steel Association (UKSA), and the European Commis-
sion have strongly criticized the President's proposals.93 The po-
sition of the UKSA is that "it is clear the 'injury' being suffered
by some segments of the U.S. steel industry is as a result of
their inefficiency and failure to restructure and consolidate over
the past decades." 9' The international community has mobilized
against the tariffs.9' A coalition of ten countries led by the
European Union, has petitioned the World Trade Organization
(WTO)96 to determine whether the President's actions were con-
sistent with WTO obligations.97 The WTO is expected to rule on
the petition in 2003. 98
II. SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR THE STEEL INDUSTRY IS
NOT WARRANTED AND PRESIDENT BUSH SHOULD ONLY
PURSUE HIS PLAN TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO GLOBAL
PROTECTIONIST PRACTICES
A. COMMON ARGUMENTS FOR STEEL INDUSTRY PROTECTION Do
NOT JUSTIFY A DEPARTURE FROM FREE TRADE PRINCIPLES
The initial question of whether the domestic steel industry
tional protection for the United States steel industry. Id.
93. U.K. STEEL ASS'N, UK STEEL INDusTRY DEPLORES BUSH MovE ON STEEL,
at http://www.uksteel.org.uk/nw73.htm (June 6, 2001).
94. Id.
95. Geoff Winestock, EU Delay on Steel-Tariff Reprisal May Boost Cooperation
with U.S., WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at A2.
96. The WTO is a global trade governance body that was created in the Uru-
guay Round of trade negotiations in 1994. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 289. It
was established to replace GATT, which had been the primary international trade
treaty since 1947. See id. The Uruguay Round was the eighth major trade negotia-
tion session in the history of GATT. See id. at 147.
97. Winestock, supra note 95. If a member country claims another has acted
inconsistently with WTO treaty obligations a panel is convened that hears both
sides' arguments before making a determination. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at
327. A safeguard provides an industry temporary protection from imports that are
fairly traded. See id. at 596. Safeguard provisions are authorized and governed by
Article XIX of GATT. Id. Article XIX allows a country to temporarily rescind its re-
sponsibilities under the GATT when imports are found to be a substantial cause of
serious injury. See id. at 596-97. This is also called an "escape clause," because it
allows member nations to "escape" their GATT commitments. Alan 0. Sykes, Pro-
tectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with
Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256 (1991). Safeguards are de-
signed to protect industries that cannot compete in the international markets. See
JACKSON, supra note 5, at 598.
98. Winestock, supra note 95.
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deserves any form of special protection should be explored be-
fore analyzing President Bush's steel initiative as a potential so-
lution to the steel industry's problems. Given the U.S. commit-
ment to free trade principles,99 the burden should be on those
seeking protectionist measures to justify a departure from these
principles. Many common arguments for trade restrictions, re-
gardless of the form the protection takes, can be applied, some
with special force, to the domestic steel industry.00 These in-
clude preventing job losses and wage decreases, protecting in-
dustries deemed essential to our national defense, and giving a
troubled industry "breathing room" to return to profitability.''
Unfortunately, each of these arguments provides insufficient
justification for protecting the domestic steel industry from in-
ternational competition.
1. Protecting Labor
One common argument is that since restraints protect the
domestic industry, more jobs are saved or created in the pro-
tected industry."2 Jobs may be created or saved in the protected
industry, however, there are also significant costs."3 It has been
estimated that President Reagan's 1984 Steel VER saved 16,900
jobs in the steel industry, but destroyed 52,400 jobs in indus-
tries that use steel; 0 4 the VER, therefore, gives steelworkers
preferential treatment over workers in other industries. In-
dustries that use steel oppose the President's plan for this rea-
son. 06 They worry that higher steel prices caused by import re-
strictions will cause them to be uncompetitive in the world
market and force them to reduce employment.107 It makes little
sense to destroy more domestic jobs than would be saved in the
name of helping U.S. workers.o8
Another common argument is that artificial restraints on
trade are needed to protect laborers in a developed nation from
99. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
103. McGee, supra note 26, at 545.
104. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
105. One explanation why they are given special treatment is because domestic
steel has a particularly strong lobby. Wessel, supra note 47. However, this does not
answer whether they deserve this preferential treatment.
106. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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competition from low wage "pauper labor" in developing coun-
tries.1 9 However, this argument ignores the reality of compara-
tive cost advantages.11 If a country has low labor costs, that
country should specialize in the production of labor intensive
goods, while their trading partners should specialize in goods
that require more capital, skilled labor, or technology."' This
principle explains why workers in Europe and Asia beg their
own governments for protection from "high-paid, efficient U.S.
workers.""' Workers in the United States have high wages be-
cause they are more efficient than workers from unindustrial-
ized countries, not because of tariff protection."3
Domestic steel workers may see heightened unemployment
if the protectionist measures are not enacted."4 The competition
from imports, especially if they are subsidized, may lead to eco-
nomic hardships for workers and their families."' However, the
hardships suffered at the hands of imports, even if subsidized,
are no different than hardships suffered by other forms of com-
petition." 6 Therefore, the displaced workers should only be enti-
tled to the protection that all displaced workers get, such as un-
employment benefits."1 7 Protection is simply an inefficient way
to alleviate the distributional effects of increased competition."
At a cost of approximately $750,000 per domestic steel job
saved," 9 there are better, more efficient ways to help displaced
workers. 20 Between the two possible options of industry protec-
tion and unemployment benefits, unemployment benefits are
more favorable from an efficiency viewpoint because they are
more targeted to the problem of alleviating distributional effects
on unemployed steel workers.' 21  Therefore, protecting U.S.
workers cannot be used as a justification for a departure from a
commitment to free trade to protect the domestic steel industry
from foreign competition.
109. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 18.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See SAMUELSON, supra note 39, at 696.
113. Id. at 697.
114. Sykes, supra note 38, at 210-11.
115. Id. at 211.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 211-12.
119. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
120. Sykes, supra note 38, at 211-12.
121. Id. at 212.
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2. National Defense
Another common argument for protecting the domestic steel
industry is that, since steel is a product essential to our national
defense, we should protect it by limiting imports. 2 This conten-
tion rests on a number of questionable premises, including "that
the domestic industry will really 'disappear' absent protection
rather than simply contract and remain capable of filling emer-
gency needs; that imports cannot continue in times of armed
conflict;.. .and that stockpiling of supplies is not cheaper than
protection most of the time."123
Analyzing these assumptions shows that the national de-
fense argument is particularly flawed when applied to the steel
industry. First, it is unlikely that the entire domestic steel in-
dustry would disappear if all trade barriers were eliminated.
24
Domestic steel shipments for military use only totaled 0.03 per-
cent of total shipments in 2000.125 Even if many unprofitable
steel companies failed, it is likely that the remaining domestic
companies will be able to meet military needs for steel. 2 1 Sec-
ond, imports could continue in times of an armed conflict, espe-
cially from countries such as Mexico, with which the United
States is unlikely to go to war and from which shipments would
not require overseas travel. 2 7 Third, steel is a product that can
be safely stored at a low cost. Therefore, protecting the entire
domestic steel industry is not required to meet our national de-
fense needs.
Moreover, enacting barriers to trade may increase the
chances of armed conflict with certain countries. Protectionist
measures reduce trade, which can depress national economies. 12"
Economic depression can increase the chances of war.129 In ad-
dition, mutually beneficial trade between countries promotes in-
ternational understanding and unity, which make it less likely
that trading countries will go to war.'3 Therefore, the national
defense argument cannot justify enacting protectionist meas-
122. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 18-19.
123. Id. at 19.
124. AM. INST. FOR INT'L STEEL, INC., supra note 39.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
128. U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 39, at
292.
129. Id. Some historians contend that President Hoover's signing of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act set the stage for World War II. Id.
130. See SAMUELSON, supra note 39, at 693-94.
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ures because the United States will be able to supply its steel
demand in times of an armed conflict even if many domestic
firms fail due to international competition. In addition, restrict-
ing international trade may actually increase the chances of an
armed conflict.
3. Breathing Room
The breathing room argument suggests that the govern-
ment should temporarily protect certain industries from compe-
tition until the industry has time to restructure and become
competitive.13' This is an argument that many in the domestic
steel industry make and is the driving force behind President
Bush's Section 201 investigation."' There is historical evidence
to suggest that giving ailing industries temporary protection
does not work. 133 For example, the U.S. steel and auto indus-
tries have both been given temporary protection before, and nei-
ther has used the opportunity to successfully restructure itself
in order to compete effectively with foreign producers.3 3 A pos-
sible reason that this does not work is that the protected indus-
try, free from competition, has no incentive to become competi-
tive. '35 More likely, powerful industries, such as steel, use their
resources to lobby the government to keep the special protection
instead of using these resources to restructure the industry.
36
Abandoning free trade principles cannot be justified by the
breathing room argument because the historical evidence shows
that the steel industry will likely squander the opportunity to
successfully restructure itself.1 3' The steel industry should not
be given special protection, and, therefore, President Bush's ef-
forts to shield the industry from competition are misguided.
B. CRITIQUE OF PRESIDENT BUSH'S STEEL INITIATIVE
President Bush's Steel Initiative consists of entering into a
VER agreement with steel producing countries to restrict out-
put, negotiating an agreement to eliminate underlying market
distorting subsidies, and enacting tariffs pursuant to an ITC
131. McGee, supra note 26, at 549.
132. Matthews, supra note 12.
133. McGee, supra note 26, at 549.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1196.
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Section 201 investigation. 138 Parts of the President's plan are al-
ready in place. 139 The President has entered into a VER agree-
ment to reduce steel-making capacity. 4° In addition, the Presi-
dent has enacted tariffs of up to thirty percent on certain steel
imports. 4
President Bush should not have entered into the VER
agreements with other steel producing countries to reduce
global steel-making capacity. Past U.S. experience with VERs
shows that although the VER might help the targeted industry,
they are too costly to justify.' It was estimated that the steel
VER agreement President Reagan entered into in 1984 in-
creased the price of domestic steel by twelve percent and cost
U.S. consumers between $1.1 and 6.8 billion. 43 In addition, al-
though 16,900 jobs were saved in the steel industry, 52,400 jobs
were lost in industries that consume steel. 4 4 More recently, the
aluminum VER agreement brokered by President Clinton cost
$500,000 per aluminum industry job saved.4 4 These numbers
show that while VERs do help the targeted industry, the bene-
fits received are much smaller than the costs. Even assuming
that an industry deserves protection, a VER is not a preferable
way to provide it. 46 A VER, unlike a tariff, does not raise reve-
nue for the restricting government.1
47
Although President Bush did get over forty steel producing
countries to agree on capacity reductions, this coalition is not
strong. 14 Because the capacity cuts are spread over ten years,
many of the agreeing governments will have changed leaders by
the time the restraints are in place. 9  Many new leaders might
be reluctant to enforce agreements made by past administra-
tions because the export restrictions are politically unpopular at
home.5 Another weakening factor is that many countries
agreed to the VER to retain access to U.S. markets and to avoid
138. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 29-32, 51 and accompanying text (explaining the costs of
President Reagan's steel VER and President Clinton's aluminum VER).
143. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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even more restrictions, such as increased tariffs, on their steel
exports to the United States."' Thus, these countries may not
be genuinely committed to reducing the steel output of their
own countries. 1 2 Their commitment to the VER may falter now
that President Bush has followed the recommendation of the
ITC and enacted tariffs on steel imports."3
Moreover, the steel VER agreement violates the U.S. obliga-
tions under GATT." 4 After the Uruguay Round of trade negotia-
tions, no member country is allowed to enter into a VER.1"
President Bush has said that his proposal will not violate GATT,
156 which may explain why the administration is not calling its
actions an attempt to enter a VER, but instead an attempt to
"reduce worldwide excess capacity.""' The VER, therefore,
should be eliminated from the Bush proposal to avoid direct con-
travention of the mandates of GATT.
The only part of President Bush's steel initiative that
should be pursued is its attempt to reach an agreement to re-
duce tariffs and subsidies worldwide. 15" This part of the plan
will increase economic efficiency globally by reducing artificial
barriers to trade. 159 With the benefits of free trade, each coun-
try's steel industry will prosper or fail according to its own mer-
its, and capital and resources will flow to more productive
uses.'60 This will ultimately benefit the citizens of each country
by reducing the total amount they, as consumers, pay for goods
and their tax burden by removing subsidies for their steel in-
dustries. 61
The President should rescind the additional tariffs on key
steel imports he enacted pursuant to the ITC's recommenda-
tions.' Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is meant to give
temporary relief from foreign competition to a struggling indus-
151. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (explaining the ITC recom-
mendation).
154. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of free
trade).
159. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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try until it can positively adjust to the import competition."'
The domestic steel industry has been under some form of protec-
tion for the past twenty-five years.' The industry has not used
this time to reorganize itself so it can successfully compete with
foreign competition.6 6 There is no reason to think it will be able
to turn itself around in the next four years.
Further, the President may not have satisfied his statutory
obligation by enacting the tariffs.' The President is supposed
to take into account several factors when deciding what type of
relief to give.'67 These include the probable effectiveness of the
actions and the economic and social costs and benefits.16  Given
the long history of providing protection to the steel industry,
three years of tariffs are unlikely to allow it to make a "positive
adjustment to import competition." 69  Likewise, it is unclear
whether economic and social benefits would outweigh the
costs. 7 ' Tariffs only add artificial costs, which steel-consuming
industries must pay and which are ultimately borne by U.S.
consumers and taxpayers. 7' Many domestic industries that use
large amounts of steel, such as automobiles and appliances, are
seriously injured by artificially high steel prices.'72 The cost to
these industries may outweigh the benefits to the steel indus-
try."'73 Although the tariffs have temporarily helped the domes-
tic steel industry, the President should rescind the tariffs be-
cause the countervailing costs are too great.
C. PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION
President Bush should help the domestic steel industry by
working to eliminate subsidies on steel production worldwide.
This is the second part of President Bush's proposal74 and the
163. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (setting forth a partial list of the
factors the President is supposed to consider when deciding on a remedy).
167. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 22,74 and accompanying text (explaining the history of steel
industry protection and stating the statutory requirements).
170. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1196.
171. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
173. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 1195-96.
174. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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only part of it that does not create artificial barriers to trade. 5
If worldwide artificial restraints on trade are eliminated, the
normal laws of supply and demand will take effect and consum-
ers will reap the benefits of a competitive market.16 Ending sub-
sidies will also placate some in the domestic industry that com-
plain they cannot compete internationally because foreign
governments subsidize their own industries more than the
United States. 7 Although achieving this commitment from
other countries may be difficult, the harsh reception that the in-
ternational community has given the President's plan may im-
ply that foreign countries would cooperate. 7 '
The average U.S. consumer would benefit from the elimina-
tion of steel import quotas and tariffs because prices would not
be artificially inflated. 9 However, if the United States lifted its
tariffs and quotas on steel, more domestic steel companies
would likely fail, which could have serious redistribution effects
and cause significant hardship on the individual steel laborer. 8 °
Protecting the industry, however, is not the best way to protect
the workers.' There are better ways, such as standard unem-
ployment and retraining, which are much cheaper and more
economically ways to alleviate distributional inequities.
8 2
The steel industry does not deserve special protection from
foreign competition.8 3 Common arguments such as protecting
labor, national defense, and giving the industry temporary relief
to allow it to reorganize were found insufficient to compromise
the U.S. commitment to free trade principles.' President
Bush's steel VER agreement and tariffs should be rescinded be-
cause the benefits do not outweigh the costs.'85 Only the Presi-
dent's proposal to negotiate an end to steel industry protection
worldwide should be pursued because ending protection would
allow each country's steel industry to adjust to competitive pres-
sures and give consumers and taxpayers the benefits of a com-
175. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 91 (explaining the benefits of free trade); see JACKSON supra
note 5, at 1195-96 (stating the past costs).
180. Sykes, supra note 38, at 210-11.
181. Id. at 211.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 99-137 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 99-137 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 138-57, 163-73 and accompanying text.
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petitive international steel market. 86
CONCLUSION
The domestic steel industry is failing. Half of the domestic
steel industry has filed for bankruptcy within the last four
years, and thousands of workers have lost their jobs.
President Bush has proposed a three-part Steel Initiative to
remedy the problems that the domestic steel industry faces.
First, the President is negotiating with trading partners to enter
into a VER agreement to reduce steel imports into the United
States. The President has entered into VER agreements with
several steel producing countries. Second, the President is
working with foreign countries to eliminate the market distort-
ing subsidies that have helped cause the domestic steel indus-
try's problems. Third, the President enacted additional tariffs
on certain steel imports based on the results of an ITC Section
201 investigation.
President Bush should not have enacted tariffs on steel im-
ports or entered into voluntary restraint agreements on steel
exports to save the domestic steel industry. Domestic steel
companies do not deserve protection from foreign competition
any more than other industries. Failure to let domestic steel
companies compete in the international markets costs U.S. con-
sumers and taxpayers, who must ultimately pay for the subsi-
dies. Although a smaller domestic steel industry may cause
hardship for individual laborers, trade barriers are an especially
inefficient and costly way to help them.
The President should focus his energies on eliminating tar-
iffs and quotas on steel globally. Only then can domestic steel
reorganize and adapt itself to competitive pressures, thereby
promoting efficiency, respecting international free trade agree-
ments, and avoiding costly, ineffective measures.
186. See supra notes 158-61, 174-82 and accompanying text.
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